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Sexual Abuse and Statistic Misuse: An Analysis of the Static-99R* 
Gauging sexual offender recidivism is akin to looking in a crystal ball to 
determine the future. The science simply cannot concretely say who will reoffend 
and who will not. Now that the Adam Walsh Act has statutorily authorized 
civil commitment for sexual offenders at the federal level, federal courts must 
grapple with the question state courts have battled for decades: What evidence 
shows whether an individual would, as a result of mental illness, have serious 
difficulty refraining from reoffending? 
This Comment explores one particular piece of evidence that courts have tended 
to find persuasive: actuarial instruments, which are statistic mechanisms based 
on historical data specific to each offender. Courts find comfort in such 
instruments because of their objectivity. The numeric output provides courts with 
something concrete to hold on to in an otherwise ambiguous field based largely 
on expert opinions. A thorough analysis of the instrument—and the courts’ 
interpretation of it—reveals important flaws that must be considered given the 
liberty interest at stake in civil commitment settings. 
By exploring in depth an emblematic actuarial instrument, the Static-99R, as 
well as judicial treatment of the instrument and the statutory language of the 
Adam Walsh Act, this Comment seeks to expose important issues seemingly 
overlooked by the courts. At present, the Static-99R as it is interpreted in judicial 
opinions does not adequately speak to the statutory language of the Adam Walsh 
Act. Simple, important considerations can remedy the problem and ensure that 
courts are civilly committing individuals based on evidence of “serious difficulty 
in refraining from reoffending” rather than just a demonstration of “likelihood” 
of reoffending. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act (“AWA” or “Act”) to “protect children from 
sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child 
pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of Adam 
Walsh and other child crime victims.”1 To achieve its purpose, the AWA created 
a federal database for sexual offenders, strengthened enforcement and detection 
of online crimes against children, and increased punishments for sexual crimes 
against children.2 
One provision of the Act garnered less media attention: the creation of 
civil commitment for federal sexual offenders.3 Under this provision, the 
government may seek civil commitment for an inmate at the end of his sentence 
if the individual (1) has committed a past act of sexual violence; (2) has a serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3) as a result of that mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder, would have “serious difficulty in refraining from 
 
 1. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587 
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.). 
 2. Six-Year-Old Adam Walsh Is Abducted, HIST. (July 24, 2019), https://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/adam-walsh-is-abducted [https://perma.cc/278H-UC8E]. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2018). 
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sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”4 In order for the government to 
win a civil commitment hearing, the government must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that each prong is met.5 
The first and second prongs are not ordinarily at issue in these hearings; 
by contrast, the third prong, concerning serious difficulty refraining from 
reoffending, is much contested and presents “the most vexing issue.”6 Although 
the advent of actuarial statistical instruments has improved assessments of 
sexual reoffense when compared to unstructured clinical judgment, the actuarial 
instruments have their own substantial limitations.7 An instrument frequently 
invoked by the government and respondents to demonstrate sexual 
dangerousness is the Static-99R.8 Though the instrument itself professes to 
“demonstrate[] only moderate predictive accuracy,”9 courts have widely 
adopted it to gauge sexual dangerousness.10 Most importantly, the Static-99R, 
a revised edition of the Static-99, speaks to a likelihood of recidivism,11 but the Act 
itself requires a finding of serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.12 Therefore, 
reliance on the Static-99R is improper in AWA13 hearings: the statute requires 
that an individual would have serious difficulty refraining, a distinctly different 
inquiry than whether an individual is likely to reoffend. 
 
 4. Id. § 4247(a)(5)–(6). 
 5. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130–31 (2010). For an example of a commitment 
order that details each prong, see United States v. Lange, 5:08-HC-2070, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
159498, at *24–35 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2012). 
 6. United States v. Carta (Carta II), 690 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 7. Anthony M. Tarescavage, Bruce M. Cappo & Yossef S. Ben-Porath, Assessment of Sex 
Offenders with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality/Inventory–2–Restructured Form, 30 SEXUAL ABUSE 
413, 414–15 (2018). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 409–11 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing two expert 
witnesses’ usage of the most recent statistical instruments available, including the Static-99); United 
States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 208–13 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing three expert witnesses’ usage of 
the Static-99 as evidence of sexual dangerousness); United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 
2012) (discussing three expert witnesses’ usage of different editions of the Static-99 instrument); Leslie 
Helmus, R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, International Comparisons of the Validity of 
Actuarial Risk Tools for Sexual Offenders, with a Focus on Static-99, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
RESEARCH 55, 58 (Douglas P. Boer et al. eds., 2011). The Static-99R is one of four editions of the 
same instrument. Sophie G. Reeves, James R.P. Ogloff & Melanie Simmons, The Predictive Validity of 
the Static-99, Static 99R, and Static-2002/R: Which One to Use?, 30 SEXUAL ABUSE 887, 888–90 (2018). 
The other three editions are the Static-99, the Static-2002, and the Static-2002R. Id. 
 9. AMY PHENIX ET AL., STATIC-99R CODING RULES 7 (2016), http://www.static99.org/
pdfdocs/Coding_manual_2016_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4DT-NSG9]. 
 10. See, e.g., State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 380 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (discussing the Static-99 as 
a valid instrument for sexual offender civil commitment matters). 
 11. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 6. 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010). 
 13. As it is used in this paper, AWA refers to the civil commitment portion of the Act, codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 4248. In connection with this statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4247 contains information pertinent 
to all civil commitment hearings, whether specifically for sexual offenders or not. 
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The utility of the Static-99R is limited both by its scientific construction 
and by the way courts interpret it. The sample population used to develop the 
Static-99R is drawn from predominately European countries and is therefore 
not directly applicable to a United States population.14 The Static-99R’s use at 
various stages in civil commitment proceedings leaves courts with a false 
impression of its ability to change over time.15 Although scientific studies have 
found that different scorers will score one individual identically, the scores 
assigned by forensic evaluators are often different, which indicates 
inconsistency in its use.16 Lastly, courts often over-rely on the instrument, 
trusting its score over important factors unique to each individual, such as 
behavioral changes over time.17 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the AWA, 
specifically the constitutional challenges that have led to its current 
interpretation, and explores the legal evolution and application of each of the 
prongs, with a focus on the “serious difficulty refraining” prong. Part II 
critiques sexual offender assessments with a specific focus on the Static-99R18 
and its limitations. Part III examines courts’ understanding and application of 
the Static-99R in civil commitment hearings. Part IV, in response to common 
criticisms, recommends much-needed changes to the instrument. 
I. THE ADAM WALSH ACT 
Among the multiple provisions of the AWA, the civil commitment 
provision is little known but carries dramatic consequences for those to whom 
it is applied. Apart from the AWA and the many state-level civil commitment 
statutes for sexual offenders,19 there is no other state or federal law that allows 
 
 14. See infra Section II.D.  
 15. See infra Section III.A. 
 16. See infra Section III.B. 
 17. See infra Sections III.C, D. 
 18. The Static-99R is one of four iterations of what is sometimes referred to as the STATIC 
suite. Amy Phenix & Douglas L. Epperson, Overview of the Development, Reliability, Validity, Scoring, 
and Uses of the Static-99, Static-99R, Static-2002, and Static-2002R, in SEXUAL OFFENDING 437, 437–55 
(Amy Phenix & Harry M. Hoberman eds., 2016); see R. Karl Hanson et al., What Sexual Recidivism 
Rates Are Associated with Static-99R and Static-2002R Scores?, 28 SEXUAL ABUSE 218, 218–19 (2016) 
[hereinafter Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates]. This paper discusses the Static-99R primarily because it 
is presently the most widely used. However, some cases may reference the Static-99, the Static-2002, 
or the Static-2002R since they were the current versions available at the time of the case. Because the 
questions discussed in those instruments have not changed through the iterations of the instrument, 
the distinction between the three versions is not relevant for the purposes of this Comment, except 
where specifically noted. 
 19. As of 2015, “[t]wenty states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) and the District 
of Columbia have enacted laws permitting the civil commitment of sexual offenders.” Civil 
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for civil commitment based on a category of crime; there is no statute that 
permits civil commitment for those who have committed murder, armed 
robbery, fraud, or any other type of crime. Instead, civil commitment statutes 
focus solely on severe mental illnesses that require continuing treatment, with 
the purpose of ensuring that an individual does not represent a substantial 
danger to himself20 or others.21 These individuals typically have multiple severe 
and generally untreated mental illnesses.22 Therefore, a detailed overview of the 
important provisions and issues that arise in a crime-specific civil commitment 
context is necessary. This part will begin with an overview of the purpose of 
the AWA and the transition from federal inmate to civilly committed 
respondent to released party. Next, each of the three prongs will be discussed 
in detail. Finally, this part will end by describing the different interpretations 
of the troublesome “serious difficulty refraining” prong. 
A. Purpose and Process 
The civil commitment portion of the AWA selects sexual offenders who 
present a substantially greater threat than the “ordinary ‘dangerous but typical 
recidivist.’”23 The government may, within the thirty days prior to the end of a 
federal inmate’s sentence, seek to certify that individual as a “sexually dangerous 
person.”24 The filing of intent to seek certification automatically acts as a stay 
of release and affords the government time to prepare for a civil commitment 
hearing.25 The government, the court, and the respondent may obtain 
psychological or psychiatric evaluations of the respondent before the hearing.26 
If the government shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual is sexually dangerous, the respondent is then committed to the 
Attorney General’s custody.27 The statute requires annual reports to the court 
from the “director of the facility in which a person is committed.”28 The facility 
 
Commitment, ATSA (Oct. 2015), http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-2 [https://perma.cc/4MWQ-
8XQU]. 
 20. There is no statutory requirement that the AWA applies only to men because the statute uses 
the word “person.” 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2018). However, it has not been applied to women nor has 
any court addressed this anomaly. 
 21. See, e.g., id. § 4246. 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Henley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 503, 505 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (describing that 
the combination of severe antisocial personality disorder and severe borderline personality disorder 
give the “synergistic effect” of the respondent’s combined diagnosis and explaining that personality 
disorders would not generally qualify for civil commitment). 
 23. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 
U.S. 407, 413 (2002)). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. §§ 4247(b), 4248(b). 
 27. Id. § 4248(d). 
 28. Id. § 4247(e)(1)(B). The Act requires the “director of the facility in which a person is 
committed” to provide a summary of the respondent’s commitment, the respondent’s treatment since 
98 N.C. L .REV. 933 (2020) 
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director is also required to inform the respondent about any applicable 
rehabilitation programs offered at that facility.29 
The AWA implicates a critical liberty interest: the right to be free from 
confinement. Because the statutory language requires that the government 
submit a certificate of dangerousness within the last month before the 
individual is scheduled for release, some have argued that the Act violates an 
individual’s due process rights.30 Furthermore, civil commitment may be 
indefinite; neither the statute nor case law provides any maximum length of 
time for commitment.31 There are two pathways to release: (1) recommendation 
by the facility or (2) petition by the respondent.32 Because the legislators 
recognized the gravity of the liberty interest at stake and the infrequency with 
which the facility recommends release, a respondent may petition the court for 
a release hearing every six months.33 The court must grant a discharge hearing 
if the motion for the discharge hearing “contains sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim for discharge that is plausible on its face.”34 
The court must release the respondent if it finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the respondent either “will not be sexually dangerous to others if 
released unconditionally”35 or that “he will not be sexually dangerous to others 
if released under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological 
care or treatment.”36 
B. Constitutional Challenges and the Limited Guidance from the Supreme Court 
Soon after the Act was put into place, respondents began attacking the Act 
on a myriad of grounds, including the evidentiary standard, procedural due 
process, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the right to a trial by jury, lack 
of adequate notice, vagueness, and equal protection.37 Early judicial decisions at 
the district court level declared the statute unconstitutional.38 Ultimately, 
though, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in the only AWA case it 
 
the last report, any changes to the respondent’s physical and mental health diagnoses, and 
recommendations about the necessity of continued commitment. Id. 
 29. Id. § 4247(e)(2). 
 30. See generally United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329–34 (D. Mass. 2007) (detailing 
multiple due process considerations). 
 31. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 174 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing that 
upholding the Act allows the government the “power to exercise indefinite civil control over” a 
respondent). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e). 
 33. See id. § 4247(h). 
 34. United States v. Maclaren, 866 F.3d 212, 218 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(1). 
 36. Id. § 4248(e)(2). 
 37. See generally United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329–34 (D. Mass. 2007) (detailing 
multiple due process considerations). 
 38. See Timms v. Johns, 700 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2010). 
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has heard, United States v. Comstock.39 Despite the plethora of due process 
challenges, both in Comstock itself and in other cases, the Comstock decision 
explicitly focused only on the congressional authority to enact the AWA under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.40 The Court plainly refused to decide any due 
process challenges.41 
After upholding the statute’s validity under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Court reiterated that it decided no due process questions, stating 
that “[w]e do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application 
denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive due process, or 
any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondents are free to pursue 
those claims on remand, and any others they have preserved.”42 
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear an AWA case on due process 
grounds despite the fact that the Act clearly implicates due process concerns. 
While it is settled law that the AWA is “civil and not criminal in nature,” courts 
recognize that AWA commitments are different from ordinary civil suits and 
provide certain additional protections.43 Those protections have evolved to 
include the right to confront witnesses, the right to counsel, and a heightened 
burden of proof from the ordinary civil standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.44 These rights are afforded because of the gravity of the liberty 
interest at stake.45 Such factors appear to mimic the rights of those who have 
been charged with a crime, which may continue to blur the line between civil 
and criminal. 
C. AWA’s Three Prongs 
1. Past Sexual Offense 
The first prong of the AWA requires that the individual has “engaged or 
attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”46 Often, 
this is a clear-cut analysis. Generally, the government seeks to commit 
individuals who have either confessed to or been convicted of past acts of sexual 
violence or child molestation.47 In 2010, at the time of the Comstock oral 
 
 39. 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010). 
 40. Id. at 132–33 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
 41. Id. at 133. 
 42. Id. at 149–50. 
 43. United States v. Searcy, 880 F.3d 116, 125 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing the significant liberty 
interest at stake). 
 44. Id. at 125. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2018). 
 47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) (No. 
08-1224) [hereinafter Comstock Oral Argument] (describing that out of the 103 persons certified as 
sexually dangerous, eighty-three were most recently in prison for sexual crimes, and the remaining 
98 N.C. L .REV. 933 (2020) 
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argument, the federal Bureau of Prisons had found that 15,000 individuals met 
the factual predicate of having engaged in a crime of sexual violence and only 
sought commitment for 105 of them.48 Justice Stevens quickly noted in oral 
argument for Comstock that having prior sexual convictions is not a necessary 
factual prerequisite to proving this element.49 
For those currently serving a sentence for a conviction of a crime of sexual 
violence or child molestation, this prong is straightforward. For those serving a 
sentence for a nonsexual crime, this prong is more complex. Because the AWA 
aims to protect the public from the most dangerous of sexual offenders,50 civilly 
committing someone who is presently serving a sentence for a nonsexual crime, 
but has a past conviction of violence, presents a paradox.51 
A third category of respondents may exist: those who have never been 
convicted of sexual violence or child molestation.52 Under the letter of the law, 
the government could seek to commit an inmate it had reason to believe was 
sexually dangerous even if that individual did not have any past convictions for 
sexually related crimes.53 This raises a procedural due process issue: a 
respondent may be committed for an alleged crime if the government can meet 
a clear and convincing standard, possibly in violation of well-settled 
constitutional criminal law requiring the government to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.54 
2. Mental Illness 
The second prong requires the government to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the individual “suffers from a serious mental illness, 
 
twenty had past histories of sexual offending; those twenty individuals were released at the ordinary 
termination of their sentence). 
 48. Id. at 25. 
 49. Id. at 24–25. 
 50. United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 51. This category represents more uncertainty than clarity. There are many reasons why someone 
may be serving a present sentence for a nonsexual crime, such as a probation violation or the 
commission of an ordinary violent crime. This category becomes much more complex in circumstances 
where the present reason for incarceration may have had a sexual component but the prosecutor decided 
not to pursue that particular line of evidence or charge. The second category is meant to reference 
circumstances where the reason the individual is presently incarcerated does not involve an additional 
sexual component. 
 52. This is in contrast to category two, where at some point in the individual’s life they did have 
a conviction for a crime of sexual violence or child molestation but were not currently serving a sentence 
for such a crime. 
 53. Comstock Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 24–25. 
 54. There is no case to date that directly addresses this issue. However, especially in the context 
of plea bargaining, it is feasible that the government would seek to civilly commit an individual who 
pled down from a higher offense. That person would have conceded guilt to a lesser offense that might 
not rise to the level of sexual violence or child molestation, but the government may have sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual had, in fact, committed 
a higher-level offense. 
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abnormality, or disorder.”55 Commonly in AWA cases these are diagnoses of 
pedophilia (or pedophilic disorder),56 antisocial personality disorder, alcohol 
and substance abuse, and paraphilia not-otherwise-specified.57 
Prior to a commitment hearing, the statute permits the court, the 
government, the defendant, or all of the above to order a psychological 
evaluation of the respondent.58 The report will include all the diagnoses that the 
evaluator, generally a psychologist or a psychiatrist, believes the respondent has; 
often multiple evaluations presented by opposing parties will volunteer 
conflicting opinions.59 Furthermore, “the statutory definition of ‘serious mental 
illness’ is not limited to either the consensus of the medical community or to 
maladies identified in the [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual],” so courts may 
find diagnoses not recognized in scientific literature or by the scientific 
community at large.60 As stated in a state law case with similar requirements, 
“the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance.”61 The court 
is ultimately tasked with deciding if the respondent has any mental illness and, 
if so, what mental illness. 
In United States v. Wooden,62 the respondent, Wooden, petitioned the court 
for release in 2016 after he was committed in 2014.63 At the hearing, four experts 
testified—two for the respondent and two for the government.64 Of the four 
experts, three diagnosed the respondent with pedophilia based on past historical 
data.65 Two experts also diagnosed the respondent with Intellectual Deficit 
Disorder (“IDD”).66 Ultimately, the court had to decide which disorders to 
assign to the respondent. The court found that “IDD is a better explanation for 
 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018). 
 56. Because these diagnoses are provided by psychologists who typically adhere to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (“DSM”) definitions of mental illnesses, the names for illnesses may change as 
the DSM changes names and diagnostic criteria. The DSM is considered by the health community to 
be the authoritative source of diagnostic criteria for mental health conditions. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 741 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing diagnoses of 
pedophilic disorder and antisocial personality disorder and alluding to substance abuse); United States 
v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 38–41 (1st Cir. 2010) (discussing at length paraphilia not-otherwise-specified 
and the legal validity of the diagnosis). Paraphilia not-otherwise-specified is a catchall for deviant 
sexual behaviors, with a loose definition that evolves with every iteration of the DSM. 
 58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(b), 4248(b); infra Part II. 
 59. See, e.g., United States. v. Wooden (Wooden II), 887 F.3d 591, 597–99 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 60. Carta II, 690 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012). In practice, experts can diagnose and testify that 
individuals have psychological conditions not recognized in the DSM, and the court adopts whichever 
diagnosis it finds most supported by the evidence. 
 61. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (describing the ambiguity as to what might 
constitute a serious mental illness or abnormality). 
 62. 887 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 63. Id. at 594. 
 64. Id. at 597–98. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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Mr. Wooden’s past criminal behavior than Pedophilic Disorder.”67 The court 
then found that IDD was not a qualifying mental disease, abnormality, or 
disorder and ordered Wooden to be released from civil commitment because he 
no longer met the requirements for commitment.68 This case marks the first 
time that a court found that a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder did not 
meet the criteria for continued commitment. Such a recognition is an 
important, positive shift in AWA cases because it indicates that courts can 
discern that not all mental illnesses—whether recognized by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (“DSM”) or not—are related to sexual dangerousness. 
3. Serious Difficulty 
Courts struggle the most in determining whether the serious difficulty 
prong is met and often look to the Static-99R for answers.69 To commit an 
individual, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that, 
as a result of the mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, the individual “would 
have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation if released.”70 Precedent affecting this prong predates the AWA 
because the statutory language is nearly identical to existing state law civil 
commitment statutes, such as the Kansas statute at issue in two U.S. Supreme 
Court cases.71 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,72 the Supreme Court had to determine the 
constitutionality of a sexual offender civil commitment statutory scheme.73 The 
Court upheld the statute because it not only asked whether or not an individual 
might be dangerous but linked that dangerousness to an additional 
component—mental illness.74 Specifically, Hendricks stated that the statute 
“requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the 
existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”75 
Perhaps unintentionally, the Court introduced an important word in this ruling 
that may have turned a seemingly one-factor test into a two-factor test.76 The 
Court stated that the respondent conceded that he “cannot ‘control the urge’ to 
molest children. This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a 
 
 67. Id. at 599. 
 68. Id. at 610 (“Wooden does not suffer from a serious mental illness, disease, or abnormality, 
and . . . therefore is not sexually dangerous.”). 
 69. Carta II, 690 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018). 
 71. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). 
 72. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 73. Id. at 350. 
 74. Id. at 358. 
 75. Id. at 358. 
 76. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from 
other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively 
through criminal proceedings.”77 The term “volitional” has spurred much 
discussion,78 and the subsequent cases attempting to resolve the confusion have 
tangled the web further rather than providing answers. 
Five years later, the Supreme Court was asked to clarify Hendricks in 
Kansas v. Crane.79 In Crane, the respondent argued that Hendricks required a 
finding of a total lack of control, while Kansas essentially argued that no lack of 
control finding was necessary.80 Crane argued that some diagnoses are purely 
emotional disorders and do not relate to a volitional control issue; essentially, 
someone who has a mental illness unrelated to actions cannot constitutionally 
be shown to have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.81 In its opinion, 
the Court turned to the issue of an “emotional” disorder versus a “volitional” 
one, acknowledging that Hendricks was limited to a volitional issue.82 The Court 
then explicitly refused to resolve the question, stating that “[t]he Court in 
Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based solely on 
‘emotional’ abnormality would be constitutional, and we likewise have no 
occasion to do so in the present case.”83 
Justice Scalia’s strongly worded dissent in Crane indicated that the Court 
added an additional element to civil commitment: “a separate finding of 
inability to control behavior.”84 He specified that 
[t]oday’s opinion says that the Constitution requires the addition of a 
[new] finding: . . . that the subject suffers from an inability to control 
behavior—not utter inability and not even inability in a particular 
constant degree, but rather inability in a degree that will vary “in light 
of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and 
the severity of the mental abnormality itself.”85 
He added the prediction that “[u]nfortunately, it gives trial courts, in future 
cases under the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas’s [sexual offender 
 
 77. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957) 
[hereinafter Crane Oral Argument]. The oral argument focused on psychological diagnoses that tend 
to indicate complete volitional control but represent a distorted reality, with one Justice likening the 
question to an individual who, due to delusions, thinks all people are rocks but is completely in control 
of his behavior. Id. at 50. The oral argument focused entirely on the different categories of diagnoses, 
including volitional, emotional, intellectual, and personality diagnoses. See id. at 3. 
 79. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 80. Id. at 411–13. 
 81. Crane Oral Argument, supra note 78, at 50–51; see supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 82. Crane, 534 U.S. at 415. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 85. Id. at 423 (quoting the majority opinion). 
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civil commitment statute], not a clue as to how they are supposed to charge the 
jury!”86 
The aftermath of Crane has led to considerable confusion and differing 
outcomes. Likely in an effort to highlight the complexity, the Second Circuit 
in Richard S. v. Carpinello87 detailed the different nuanced interpretations of the 
prong.88 The court, attempting to determine what the standard actually 
required, identified that a majority of states found that Crane did not require an 
additional finding of volitional control issues, but notably indicated that states 
required a volitional control component.89 
Ambiguous terminology that conflates emotional and volitional issues 
leads to confused legal opinions. A careful reading of many of the cases 
referenced in Richard S. reveals that, although an additional factor was not 
created, the court nonetheless found a volitional control issue.90 Alternatively, 
the courts conflate emotional and volitional impairments, with one court stating 
that “[a] person with an emotional impairment might be subject to fits of anger 
or meanness so extreme that he cannot control his actions.”91 Importantly, the 
Fourth Circuit, where many of these cases are heard,92 has found that “[t]he 
‘serious difficulty’ prong of [the AWA] refers to the degree of the person’s 
‘volitional impairment,’ which impacts the person’s ability to refrain from 
acting upon his deviant sexual interests.”93 Judges are not psychologists, and 
they often acknowledge that they are not equipped to fully understand nuanced 
diagnoses and how different conditions interface with dangerousness.94 
 
 86. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 87. 589 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 88. For a thorough description of how various jurisdictions interpret this requirement, see id. at 
83–84. 
 89. Id. at 82–83. 
 90. See, e.g., Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2005) (“By concluding that Laxton has 
a mental disorder and that his mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in 
acts of sexual violence, the court explained, the jury had to conclude that Laxton’s mental disorder 
involved serious difficulty to him in controlling his behavior.”). 
 91. In re W.Z., 773 A.2d 97, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 92. The overwhelming majority of AWA cases are heard in the Fourth Circuit because the only 
treatment facility for civilly committed sexual offenders is located in Butner, North Carolina. Lifelong 
Pedophile and Violent Offender Committed to Federal Custody as a Sexually Dangerous Person, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST.: U.S. ATTY’S OFF. E. DISTRICT N.C. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
ednc/pr/lifelong-pedophile-and-violent-offender-committed-federal-custody-sexually-dangerous 
[https://perma.cc/4FAT-GYC7] (“The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina litigates all Adam Walsh Act cases for the entire country. All sexually dangerous 
persons who are committed to federal custody are housed in a federal facility in that district, where 
intensive, residential treatment is offered to them.”). 
 93. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). 
 94. See Crane Oral Argument, supra note 78, at 48 (“We’re not psychiatrists or psychologists 
either. That’s . . . part of the problem . . . .”). 
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II. SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SEXUAL OFFENDER ASSESSMENT 
METHODS 
Courts hear evidence for each of the three prongs of the AWA and rely 
heavily on expert testimony about psychologists’ clinical impressions of the 
individual.95 One important tool that clinicians rely on for their testimony and 
reports to the court is risk assessments of sexual offenders.96 These reports are 
thoroughly developed and often include tools like the Static-99R.97 Although 
the Static-99R is not more predictive than other actuarial tools, it is the most 
researched and easily used by “diverse professionals using commonly available 
information” such as past criminal history and the individual’s age.98 Because 
the Static-99R is the primary tool used in court reports and has been widely 
researched, it will be the focus of this Comment as illustrative of other similar 
tools. 
This part will begin by explaining the major components of a sexual 
offender report and will then discuss the Static-99R in detail, culminating with 
an analysis of the instrument’s limitations. 
A. The Forensic Sexual Offender Risk Assessment Reports 
When considering an individual for civil commitment, the court must 
order a psychological evaluation of that individual, which culminates in a report 
to the court.99 The “[r]isk assessment informs all participants in the criminal 
justice system, from police to treatment providers, of the future likelihood of 
certain individuals to cause harm.”100 The lengthy evaluation may vary from one 
evaluator to another, but there are generally accepted components and 
practices.101 A well-written report will “clearly demonstrate how conclusions 
 
 95. For an example, see Order at 22, United States v. Yates, No. 5:08-HC-02073-BR (E.D.N.C. 
Mar. 2, 2018), ECF No. 168 [hereinafter Yates Order]. 
 96. Kevin Baldwin, Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING INITIATIVE 133, 136–37 (2017), https://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/
pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf [perma.cc/G2MX-ZJZ2 (discussing unstructured clinical 
judgment as the first generation of sexual offender assessment methodology and describing 
advancements in expert reporting). 
 97. For a thorough summary of different evaluators’ reports, see Yates Order, supra note 95, at 22 
n.3. 
 98. R. Karl Hanson et al., Communicating the Results of Criterion Referenced Prediction Measures: Risk 
Categories for the Static-99R and Static-2002R Sexual Offender Risk Assessment Tools, 29 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESSMENT 582, 584 (2016) [hereinafter Hanson et al., Risk Categories]. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (2018). 
 100. Sex Offender Risk Assessment, ATSA (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.atsa.com/pdfs/
SexOffenderRiskAssessmentBriefWithBibliography2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B2Y-P4BF]. 
 101. See Anita Schlank, Saprina Matheny & Jessica Schilling, Overview of Assessment of Sexual 
Offenders, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 247, 247. 
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were drawn and . . . highlight any inconsistencies in the data or limitations to 
the conclusions.”102 
Sexual offender evaluations may serve different purposes and different 
portions may be appropriate only for certain populations; an evaluation for child 
custody situations clearly will contain different material than one for civil 
commitment purposes.103 Because over twenty states have enacted civil 
commitment statutes in addition to the AWA,104 the evaluator must ensure that 
his or her report speaks specifically to the language of the statute under which 
the respondent falls and apply the appropriate burden of proof, which varies by 
statute.105 
A typical civil commitment evaluation has three parts: (1) a clinical 
diagnosis and opinion; (2) implementation and integration of statistical 
instruments (like the Static-99R) and other scientific research; and (3) a 
determination of present dangerousness.106 Generally, the first portion consists 
of clinical judgment determinations, which are based on a clinician’s 
professional experience.107 The evaluator conducts a clinical interview where the 
sexual offender is informed about the purpose of the interview and told that any 
information the offender offers in the interview will not be treated as 
confidential.108 
The next portion of the evaluation attempts to determine a likelihood of 
reoffense by looking at many factors, including general rates of reoffense, 
combined results of actuarial instruments, risk factors associated with reoffense, 
 
 102. Id. at 247–48. 
 103. See id. at 248. 
 104. Civil Commitment, supra note 19. 
 105. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2018) (requiring a demonstration of “serious difficulty in 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation”), with WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 71.09.020(18) (2019) (defining a sexually violent predator for civil commitment purposes as someone 
who would be “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence”). 
 106. See Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders: A 
Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 425, 430 (2007); Schlank et al., supra note 101, at 248. The purpose 
of the interview is to understand the individual’s sexual history, so the psychologist will attempt to 
discern information such as the individual’s perception and account of his past sexual offenses. See id. 
at 249. Supplemented by the individual’s factual and criminal record, the evaluator will then conduct 
assessments for a wide array of diagnoses, such as pedophilia, substance abuse, antisocial personality 
disorder, anxiety, depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and intellectual deficits. See id. 
at 249–53. 
 107. See Risk Assessment, ATSA, http://www.atsa.com/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/85GC-
RGW2]. 
 108. Harry M. Hoberman & Rebecca L. Jackson, Forensic Evaluations of Sexual Offenders: Principles 
and Practices for Almost All Sexual Offender Appraisals, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 353, 
367. 
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clinical judgment, and any relevant special considerations.109 Often, one or more 
common statistical instruments are used.110 
Finally, the evaluator will write a report detailing the diagnoses and risk 
results of the evaluation as well as a recommendation to the court as to whether 
the individual meets the criteria for civil commitment.111 A well-written report 
incorporates, but does not solely rely on, clinical judgment and primarily refers 
to scientifically validated sources to best explain the conclusions reached by the 
evaluator.112 
B. Instrument Types and Statistic Viability 
An actuarial risk instrument establishes risk predictions based only on 
known, factual information, such as the number of past convictions or the 
offender’s age.113 It is devoid of clinical judgment.114 Modern evaluators praise 
these instruments for their improved accuracy over clinical judgment, their 
inter-user reliability, and their ability to be researched and evaluated—a distinct 
benefit over the unstructured clinical judgment approach.115 
Multiple statistical instruments gauge sexual offender recidivism with 
approximately equal accuracy when looking at population-level risk factors and 
rates of recidivism.116 However, when these instruments are applied to an 
 
 109. See id. at 384. 
 110. Id. Some frequent examples include the MnSOST-R, SVR-20, Rapid Risk Assessment for 
Sexual Offense Recidivism (“RRASOR”), and Static-99. Baldwin, supra note 96, at 139–40. 
 111. For a thorough discussion about the report writing process, see Hoberman & Jackson, supra 
note 108, at 386–89. 
 112. See Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, ATSA (Aug. 17, 2010), 
https://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators [https://perma.cc/ZVB8-
3WCQ]. 
 113. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Actuarial Risk Assessment Models: A Review of Critical Issues Related to 
Violence and Sex-Offender Recidivism Assessments, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 438, 438 (2000). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 58; Sreenivasan et al., supra note 113, at 438. 
 116. Howard E. Barbaree, Calvin M. Langton & Edward J. Peacock, Different Actuarial Risk 
Measures Produce Different Risk Rankings for Sexual Offenders, 18 SEXUAL ABUSE 423, 423–24 (2006) 
[hereinafter Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Risk Measures]. For a summary of the comparative 
predictive accuracy of actuarial instruments, see Dale Arnold & Marianne Davis, Risk Factors and Risk 
Assessments for Sexual Offense Recidivism, in SEXUAL OFFENDING, supra note 18, at 417, 429. Many 
studies have explored the comparative accuracy of common static instruments including but not limited 
to the Static-99, RRASOR, SACJ-Min, Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (“SORAG”), and Risk 
Matrix 2000. See generally Howard E. Barbaree et al., Evaluating the Predictive Accuracy of Six Risk 
Assessment Instruments for Adult Sex Offenders, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 490, 490 (2001) (comparing 
multiple sexual offender actuarial instruments); R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk 
Assessments for Sex Offenders: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 119 
(2000) (describing that the predictive accuracy of three actuarial instruments, the RRASOR, SACJ-
Min, and Static-99, were all approximately equal); Drew A. Kingston et al., Long-Term Predictive 
Validity of the Risk Matrix 2000: A Comparison with the Static-99 and the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide, 
20 SEXUAL ABUSE 466, 466 (2008) (comparing the predictive accuracy of the Static-99, SORAG, and 
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individual sexual offender, they may incorrectly predict whether that offender 
is likely to recidivate.117 In fact, one study found that when comparing the five 
most common instruments, 55% of the study participants were classified as 
“high risk” in at least one of the instruments, but only 3% of the participants 
were classified as high risk in all five instruments.118 The challenge for an 
evaluator is to determine which instrument they believe paints the most correct 
image of the offender—a determination that relies heavily on clinical judgment, 
the factor that actuarial instruments were designed to remove. 
In contrast to actuarial instruments, a dynamic assessment focuses on 
factors likely to change with time, such as progress in treatment, self-regulation, 
and deviant sexual interest.119 Dynamic instruments, though often used for 
general crime assessments, are a newer creation in the field of sexual offender 
assessments and, as such, are not as well researched.120 Preliminary studies show 
promise for certain dynamic instruments and indicate that, when dynamic 
instruments are combined with an actuarial risk instrument, they better predict 
recidivism risk than either tool alone.121 
C. The Static-99 and Its Progeny 
Although there are over a dozen actuarial risk assessments created 
specifically for determining likelihood of sexual offender recidivism, by far the 
most prominent, most researched, and most common is the Static-99R.122 
Because the instrument is short and concise, it is available at appendix A to 
assist the reader in understanding the instrument.123 
The Static-99R gauges an individual’s relative risk rather than absolute 
risk.124 Risk measures how likely a certain outcome is to occur based on certain 
exposures. Relative risk measures how much more likely an exposed group is to 
have a certain outcome than an unexposed group. For instance, we may want to 
know how much more likely smokers are than nonsmokers to develop lung 
cancer. The “exposed” group would encompass those who have smoked, and the 
 
Risk Matrix 2000, finding the three approximately equal with the SORAG having a slightly higher 
predictive accuracy). 
 117. Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Measures, supra note 116, at 437. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Gwenda M. Willis, Tony Ward & Jill S. Levenson, The Good Lives Model (GLM): An 
Evaluation of GLM Operationalization in North American Treatment Programs, 26 SEXUAL ABUSE 58, 60 
(2014). 
 120. See Reinhard Eher et al., Dynamic Risk Assessment in Sexual Offenders Using STABLE-2000 and 
the STABLE-2007: An Investigation of Predictive and Incremental Validity, 24 SEXUAL ABUSE 5, 6 (2012). 
 121. Robert J. McGrath, Michael P. Lasher & Georgia F. Cumming, The Sex Offender Treatment 
Intervention and Progress Scale (SOTIPS): Psychometric Properties and Incremental Predictive Validity with 
Static-99R, 24 SEXUAL ABUSE 431, 443 (2012). 
 122. Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 58. 
 123. Infra Appendix A. 
 124. See Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 219. 
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“unexposed” group would be those who have never smoked. After finding the 
risk rates for each group, we would calculate the relative risk (sometimes called 
risk ratio) to determine how much more likely the exposed group would be to 
develop lung cancer than the unexposed group. For another example, we know 
that we always risk getting in a car crash when traveling in a car. We also know 
that someone who is driving while intoxicated is more likely to get in a car crash 
than someone who is sober. We would look at the risk of the exposed group 
(drunk drivers) and the unexposed group (non-drunk drivers) to determine each 
group’s risk of incurring a certain outcome (car crashes). The relative risk 
measures how much more likely it is that a drunk driver would be in a car crash 
than an ordinary person. Similarly, the Static-99R does not answer how likely 
anyone is to commit a crime of sexual violence but instead how much more 
likely one group of sexual offenders is to recidivate than another group of sexual 
offenders.125 The mechanism used to determine recidivism rate is the 
individual’s score on the actuarial instrument and the most current statistical 
tables of recidivism.126 
The protective factors (factors that can decrease the likelihood of 
recidivism) of the Static-99R include advanced age at release, having lived with 
a lover for at least two years, and having exclusively female victims.127 
Conversely, factors identified as likely to increase rates of recidivism include 
current and prior convictions and charges for both sexual and nonsexual 
violence, victims who are related (incest) or who are strangers (not known and 
also not related), and the inclusion of male victims.128 Because it is an actuarial 
instrument, the Static-99R does not include any dynamic factors; the score 
someone receives when they enter prison will not change except for the age 
factor. 
The final scores range from -3 to 13, and relative risk increases as the score 
increases.129 A score of -3 or -2 indicates a low risk for reoffense (Level I); a 
score of -1 or 0 indicates below-average risk of reoffense (Level II); a score of 
1–3 indicates an average risk of reoffense (Level III); a score of 4 or 5 indicates 
an above-average risk of reoffense (Level IVa); and a score of 6+ indicates a 
well-above-average risk of reoffense (Level IVb).130 Notably, the creators of the 
Static-99R acknowledge in other scholarship that “[t]here are no universal 
standards for labeling relative or absolute likelihoods of adverse events . . . . A 
10% chance of a hurricane is high risk; a 10% chance of rain is not.”131 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 220. 
 127. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 94. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 583 (citation omitted). 
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With a basic understanding of the instrument’s design in place, this 
Comment will now analyze the accuracy and implementation of the Static-99R. 
D. Accuracy and Sample Population 
The primary statistic used to gauge the accuracy of both actuarial and 
dynamic instruments is the derivative of the Receiver Operating 
Characteristics, called the Area Under the Curve (“AUC”).132 This statistic 
compares how often false positives occur compared with true positives at each 
predictive point.133 It is used with binary groups to determine how correctly a 
test can determine who is “in” and who is “out.”134 For sexual offenders, the “in” 
group is those who recidivate, and the “out” group is those who do not 
recidivate.135 Metrics for an AUC range from 0.5 to 1.0, with 1.0 representing a 
perfect classification system that can always classify who is in the “in” group 
correctly and who is in the “out” group correctly.136 An output of 0.5 indicates 
that the instrument is no better at predicting who falls in what group than 
random guessing.137 
Despite the moderate accuracy of the Static-99R, courts still routinely use 
the instrument in civil commitment settings without adequately contextualizing 
the instrument’s professed accuracy. In fact, only in four AWA cases has a court 
described the instrument as having “moderate predictive accuracy,”138 even 
though the Static-99R itself professes “moderate predictive accuracy,”139 which 
is validated in other studies revealing an AUC of 0.69–0.70.140 When combined 
with other assessments, particularly dynamic ones, the AUC increases to 0.80–
0.83.141 The sample population used to develop the original Static-99 consisted 
of only 1086 sexual offenders, but the risk tables were updated with new 
information from a sample consisting of 6706 offenders from seventeen 
 
 132. See Roos Colman, Interpretation of the AUC, DATASCIENCE+ (Sept. 15, 2018, 3:42 PM), 
https://datascienceplus.com/interpretation-of-the-auc/ [https://perma.cc/AU89-GHDJ]. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 587. 
 136. See ROC Curves and Area Under the Curve Explained, DATA SCH. (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.dataschool.io/roc-curves-and-auc-explained/ [https://perma.cc/D2SA-2UEW]. 
 137. Id. 
 138. A search on Lexis Advance on December 26, 2019 for “moderate predictive accuracy” returned 
thirty-two cases total that use the term “moderate predictive accuracy.” Of those, seven cases were 
federal cases. Of those seven, only four were AWA cases. See United States v. King, No. 5:09-HC-
2076-FA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54655, at *24 (E.D.N.C. Ap. 17, 2013); United States v. Volungus, 
No. 07-12060-GAO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31069, at *24 (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2012); United States v. 
Hunt, 643 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Harnden, No. CV 06-6960 DSF, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97341, at *28 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2006). Notably, only one of these cases was 
published. 
 139. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 7. 
 140. Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 589. 
 141. PHENIX ET AL., supra note 9, at 93; McGrath et al., supra note 121, at 444. 
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different replication studies when the creators found significantly lower rates 
of recidivism than originally published, a change that has been incorporated into 
the Static-99R.142 The present AUC rates are based off of a sample of 8805 
sexual offenders from twenty-three different studies.143 Even though the sample 
population has increased significantly since the first iteration of the Static-99, 
its accuracy remains overlooked—or, at a minimum, underacknowledged—in 
judicial opinions. 
Though rarely discussed in the literature, the sample population used to 
develop and validate the Static-99R presents problems for its use in a United 
States population. Of the twenty-three studies, only 21% of the individuals 
studied were from the United States (n = 1811).144 Though it is beneficial to 
assess the Static-99R’s applicability across different countries and cultures, the 
Static-99R developers did not include a variable for how the law in different 
countries might have an effect on the accuracy of the instrument.145 Instead, the 
creators only looked at the time between release and the next charge or 
conviction if there was one. Although these two categories were evenly split in 
the study overall (charges n = 10, convictions n = 11), only one of the five studies 
from the United States used conviction data; the other four used only charges.146 
While many of the countries generally agree on crimes that constitute sexual 
offenses, there are important differences as well.  
For example, in Canada, which comprises 33% of the population studied 
(n = 2865),147 the Solicitor General’s High Risk Offenders Working Group 
concluded that civil commitment processes would “not meet the constraints 
posed by Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” which led to the 
government’s decision not to create a civil commitment scheme in the 
country.148 Studies have noted that although there are “myriad similarities 
between the United States and Canada . . . correctional philosophies and 
practices can be quite different, with criminal sentences in the United States 
tending to be longer and more frequently employed in managing risk posed by 
offenders.”149 The study also notes that sexual offenders in Canada “receive 
determinate sentences and return to the community at the end of those 
 
 142. Hanson et al., Risk Categories, supra note 98, at 593. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Hanson et al., Recidivism Rates, supra note 18, at 223. 
 145. See id. The data provided in this study indicates that there was no variable accounting for 
differences in law in different countries. 
 146. Id. at 223–24. 
 147. Id. at 223. 
 148. Michael Petrunik, Lisa Murphy & J. Paul Fedoroff, American and Canadian Approaches to Sex 
Offenders: A Study of the Politics of Dangerousness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 111, 117 (2008). 
 149. Robin J. Wilson et al., Comparing Sexual Offenders at the Regional Treatment Centre (Ontario) 
and the Florida Civil Commitment Center, 57 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 
377, 378 (2012). 
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sentences,” in direct contrast to the United States where many states and the 
federal government permit civil commitment.150 Though a small-scale study 
suggests that civil commitment has no effect on recidivism rate,151 it remains 
unknown whether the Static-99R is equally accurate in the United States and 
Canada. 
In Sweden, which accounts for 15% of the study population (n = 1278),152 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognizes that the increase in sexual offenses 
within the past decade is due, in large part, to changes in Swedish legislation, 
such as expanding the definition of rape.153 The Ministry specifically 
acknowledges that “it is difficult to compare the figures [of sexual offenses rates] 
over time.”154 Furthermore, the Ministry adds that “[i]t is also difficult to make 
international comparisons based on crime statistics, as many acts that are 
considered rape under Swedish law are not considered rape in many other 
countries.”155 Though the Swedish government does not delineate specifically 
what countries record and charge crimes differently, the government highlights 
“three important factors to remember” that differentiate Swedish criminal 
statistics from other countries: (1) all reported events are recorded as crimes, 
even if some of these events are later found not to constitute criminal offenses; 
(2) every offense that occurs at the same time is counted separately, even though 
many countries may record “offenses of the same kind against a single victim” 
as one crime; and (3) attempted offenses are “counted together with completed 
crimes.”156 As a result, Sweden may be calculating higher recidivism rates than 
those in the United States, particularly as it relates to charged but not convicted 
offenses, thereby skewing the applicability of the Static-99R’s dataset to a 
United States population. 
Other notable differences exist in the international population. Germany, 
which accounts for 10.6% of the sample (n = 936),157 does not have mandatory 
reporting laws for suspected incidents of child molestation.158 Compared to 
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countries which require mandatory reporting, Germany may have lower charge 
and conviction rates, since fewer cases are investigated. Austria, which accounts 
for 8% of the sample population (n = 706),159 changed its age of consent laws in 
2002, lowering the age from nineteen to fourteen.160 Since the Static-99 creators 
relied on a study of recidivism in the timeframe of 2000–2005, it is unclear 
whether these recidivism rates are accurate within Austria, let alone outside of 
Austria. New Zealand, accounting for 5.6% of the population (n = 492),161 allows 
a court to impose an additional sentence of up to five years for sexual offenders 
who the court believes may be likely to reoffend.162 While similar to civil 
commitment, the maximum length of time differentiates it, and the deterrent 
effect of this law remains unclear. The United Kingdom represents 4.6% of the 
study population (n = 406).163 The UK, however, does not permit civil 
commitment and recognizes it as a human rights violation, famously going so 
far as to refuse to extradite an accused United States sexual offender on the 
grounds that he could be civilly committed if returned to the United States.164 
Denmark, which hosts 3.5% of the study population (n = 311),165 recently 
increased penalties for sexual offenses, and the deterrent effect of this law has 
not yet been studied as it relates to the applicability of the Static-99R.166 The 
combined inconsistency of laws and policies and lack of research on each of 
these specific populations as it relates to the accuracy of the Static-99R raises 
serious concerns about the applicability of the instrument to United States 
sexual offenders. 
Experts routinely generalize the findings from these twenty-three sexual 
offender studies to the United States’ federally incarcerated population despite 
criticism.167 The different countries represented in the studies all have different 
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laws and cultural norms for sexual offenses.168 A paper authored by many of the 
creators of the Static-99R provides an example, cautioning that since “[n]ot all 
sexual offenses are universal,” to apply “actuarial tools to behaviors beyond the 
scope of the scale’s development can be an inappropriate extrapolation.”169 The 
authors give the example of statutory rape, describing that “laws in some 
countries prohibit an 18-year-old male from having sex with his willing 16-year-
old girlfriend,” but that “this activity was not illegal in the countries on which 
Static-99 was developed (Canada and the United Kingdom). The meaning of 
this type of behavior may be sufficiently distinct from the types of activities 
captured in the development of Static-99.”170 The authors then specifically state 
that “applying [the Static-99] to cases of ‘consensual’ teenage sex among 
similar-aged peers is not recommended.”171 
A short hypothetical helps to explain the dilemma of the Static-99R. Mr. 
Scott is a thirty-four-year-old male. When he was eighteen, he had consensual 
sex with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend of one year. Her parents found out, and 
because of the multiple instances of sexual intercourse, the district attorney 
charged Mr. Scott with three counts of statutory rape—a sexual crime—but 
later dropped the charges. Four years later, when Mr. Scott was twenty-two, he 
was in a bar fight and was convicted of assault. Mr. Scott has never lived with 
any of his girlfriends. Now, Mr. Scott is to be released from his present sentence 
for sexual battery and physical assault of his new girlfriend of three months but 
maintains his innocence and says his public defender told him he needed to take 
a plea deal. 
On the Static-99R, Mr. Scott would receive one point for being released 
after age eighteen but before thirty-five, one point for never having lived with 
a lover for at least two years, one point for having a violent crime attached to 
the offense for which he is currently in prison, one point for having a prior 
conviction for a violent act, and two points for simply having three prior charges 
for sexual crimes. Whether or not he was convicted of these charges is irrelevant 
for the purposes of the Static-99R. Mr. Scott would score a six on the Static-
99R, placing him in the category labeled “well-above-average risk” of 
reoffending, which is the highest category of risk provided in the Static-99R, 
despite never being convicted of a sexual offense until the present instance. 
If Mr. Scott lived in Canada, where statutory rape is not an offense for 
which he could be charged, and had served one more year in prison so his age 
at release would be thirty-five, his score would be a three on the Static-99R, 
which would place him in the “average risk” of reoffending category, indicating 
that he is no more likely to recidivate than any other offender. 
 
 168. Helmus et al., supra note 8, at 59. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 59–60. 
 171. Id. 
98 N.C. L .REV. 933 (2020) 
2020] SEXUAL ABUSE & STATISTIC MISUSE 955 
The government likely would not even attempt to civilly commit Mr. 
Scott since there is no indication of a mental illness. The above example 
illustrates how easy it is to score in a high-risk category with relatively common 
charges and convictions and shows how simply living in a different jurisdiction 
could dramatically affect the likelihood of reoffense analysis. Because of the 
variability in laws from the countries included in the study, the populations 
studied may not accurately reflect risks of reoffense in the United States; 
statutory rape is just one example where countries differ on sexual crimes.172 
Even studies limited to determining the accuracy of the Static-99R within one 
country have found that the accuracy of the instrument varies by race or ethnic 
group.173 Because the United States only represented 21% of the study’s sample 
and no studies have focused on the application of the Static-99R to an 
exclusively American population, the accuracy of the instrument as applied to 
an American population is unknown, which is problematic.174 
E. Understanding What the Static-99R Means 
In addition to the above problem of the demographic sample, the Static-
99R also does not speak to an individual’s likelihood of reoffending. Instead, it 
explains the rate at which all offenders who scored similarly reoffend. To 
illustrate this nuance, consider rates of smoking. In the United States, 17.1% of 
the adult population is classified as a smoker.175 That does not mean that each 
person in the United States is 17.1% likely to become a smoker; it means that 
presently, out of all of the people in the United States, 17.1% smoke.176 Because 
of extensive scientific research, we know what traits are more closely associated 
with smokers as compared to nonsmokers, such as having a low income, not 
completing high school, and living in an urban setting.177 We can combine those 
factors and get a more accurate prediction as to whether someone is likely to 
become a smoker or not in the first place, and ultimately we find out whether 
or not someone is a smoker. We also know that, of the 55.4% of smokers who 
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have attempted to quit, less than 10% were successful.178 We do not have the 
science to understand why such a small number were successful (although we 
do have suspicions), nor do we know any scientifically validated factors that 
might make one person with equal access to the same resources more successful 
than another at quitting smoking despite his or her stated desire to quit.179 
The Static-99R functions much in the same way. It looks at what the past 
traits of sexual offenders are to determine what factors are most related to sexual 
reoffense. It can tell us how often something happens within a group of people, 
but not why that thing happens with some people but not others. 
For instance, if Mr. Scott scores a six (Level IVb well-above-average risk), 
he can then be compared to all study participants who have scored a six 
according to the “high risk/need” classification.180 The most recent analysis 
demonstrated that sixteen out of thirty-nine offenders studied who scored a six 
reoffended, or 41%, at a ten-year follow-up.181 Think of this first part like 
knowing that 17.1% of the population smokes. The next step is a nuanced 
distinction. Mr. Scott is not himself 41% likely to recidivate (just like how each 
person in the United States is not 17.1% likely to be a smoker); rather, 
individuals who score the same as Mr. Scott recidivate at a rate of 41% over ten 
years. Similarly, we do not know why out of 55.4% of people who try to quit 
smoking, only 10% are successful. But we do know that 10% are successful. The 
Static-99R does not predict whether Mr. Scott himself will recidivate (or 
successfully quit smoking), nor does it offer any information that might indicate 
whether Mr. Scott would be in the “in” group, representing 41% of the 
population studied, or in the “out” group, representing 59% of the population 
studied. 
It would be incorrect to say that Mr. Scott has a 41% chance of reoffending. 
It would be much more accurate to say that out of the individuals studied who 
scored the same as Mr. Scott on the Static-99R, within ten years, 41% had 
reoffended. We do not have the science to know what specific factors are 
associated with the individuals who made up the 41%. We only know that they 
did reoffend. Therefore, we do not know if Mr. Scott will reoffend. Mr. Scott 
himself may have anywhere from a 0% chance to a 100% chance of reoffending. 
All we know is that out of a cohort who received the same score, 41% will 
reoffend within ten years. 
The creators of the Static-99R were well aware that the instrument does 
not capture all relevant information.182 The instrument’s manual even states that 
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“a prudent evaluator will always consider other external factors, such as dynamic 
or changeable risk factors, that may influence risk in either direction.”183 The 
manual elaborates with examples, such as if the offender states he wants to harm 
his victims (higher risk) or if the offender was constantly in the “company of 
someone who will support non-offending (lower risk).”184 As the manual wisely 
advises, the “Static-99R is intended as one component of a risk assessment 
report. Additional information should be considered external to the scale.”185 
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF USING THE STATIC-99R 
Now that the scientific limitations of the Static-99R have been explored, 
the instrument’s limitations will be explored from the legal perspective. This 
part will look at how courts actually apply the Static-99R in AWA cases and 
whether that application is appropriate to demonstrate that an individual would 
have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending, as the Act requires. This 
part begins with some considerations specific to those who are civilly 
committed, explores how courts understand the Static-99R, and ends with a 
discussion of whether the Static-99R speaks to the statutory language. 
A. Special Considerations of the Static-99R for Civilly Committed Persons 
As the name indicates, the Static-99R involves factors that are designed 
not to change while incarcerated.186 Although this Comment primarily focuses 
on the use of Static-99R in initial commitment hearings, this problem is 
compounded for release hearings. The Static-99R is used in both types of 
hearings frequently and is often incorporated in a new evaluation to determine 
if the individual is sexually dangerous, rather than referencing the previous 
Static-99R from the record. 
Rescoring the Static-99R as a new piece of evidence is problematic because 
it signals to judges that the person has not “progressed” in some way. These 
reports do not typically acknowledge that only unusual circumstances would 
cause the Static-99R to change, and the government in particular is quick to 
point out when a decrease is due only to age.187 Rescoring the Static-99R implies 
that there are individuals whose Static-99R scores could change, and that this 
particular offender is not one of them. This is misleading. Though theoretically 
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a Static-99R score may decrease, perhaps due to an initial miscalculation or a 
reversal of a conviction on appeal, by the time someone reaches the civil 
commitment stage, either in an initial commitment or a release hearing, his 
Static-99R score is likely so high that any minor error would not make a 
meaningful difference in the Static-99R classification. 
An individual’s Static-99R score, at the time all crimes have been revealed, 
would have no ability to change aside from advancing age.188 Prior to an initial 
commitment hearing, an individual would likely not have had a reason to be 
scored on the Static-99R, so its inclusion in these hearings is understandable, 
though often misinterpreted as described below. Many individuals who are 
civilly committed under the AWA were early commitments, dating nearly to 
the start of the Act, and have been committed for a decade or more. The use of 
the Static-99R, particularly coupled with statements indicating that any 
decrease due to age is not meaningful, skews both what the instrument is 
designed to do and what information can be gleaned from the instrument. 
B. Issues in Court Analyses of Static-99R Scores—United States v. Schmidt 
Perhaps the biggest drawback to the Static-99R’s use is that courts must 
grapple with the Static-99R in the context of complex expert witness testimony. 
In AWA cases, that testimony can become highly statistical and somewhat 
manipulated; well-intentioned judicial opinions display the misuse of these 
instruments. One issue that frequently arises in civil commitment hearings is 
determining which expert is correct.189 Nearly all experts will use the Static-
99R, among other tools, to evaluate an offender.190 Interestingly, evaluators will 
commonly score the offender differently,191 despite the Static-99R’s claim of 
great inter-rater reliability leading to consistency in scoring. The recent case 
United States v. Schmidt192 provides useful language for analysis. This case 
revolved around a seventy-five-year-old man who committed his first act of 
child molestation in 1984 and had a lengthy criminal sexual history.193 The 
Bureau of Prisons attempted to certify Schmidt as a sexually dangerous person, 
but the district court found that he did not meet the criteria for commitment.194 
The court explained that out of the five experts who testified, “the Court 
elect[ed] to give [one of the government’s experts] testimony less weight, apart 
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from again emphasizing her determination that respondent scored a 3–4 on the 
Static-99R, which corresponds to a moderate risk.”195 The other four experts 
“all scored the respondent as a 5 on the Static 99R.”196 Two experts “put his risk 
of recidivism at 15 to 21% over a five year period,” but a third expert “found 
that the recidivism rate was 15.2% over five years.”197 After describing that two 
experts also conducted additional assessments, including the Static-2002R198 
and SVR-20, each finding different results, the court noted that “these 
assessments represent averages, and do not cleanly line up with any one 
individual’s actual risk of offending.”199 
The court addressed dynamic risk factors before summarizing the 
testimony: 
Both Dr. Saleh and Dr. Plaud testified that respondent would not have 
serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation if released. Dr. Hastings and Dr. Zinik, while coming to 
similar conclusions in their actuarial analysis, gave less weight both to 
respondent’s age and his lack of infractions over the last fifteen years in 
finding that he would have difficulty. Because this Court finds that 
respondent’s age and current status are highly relevant, it chooses to give 
Dr. Saleh and Dr. Plaud’s testimony more weight. While respondent was 
first convicted later in life than others committing similar offenses, at 
the age of 41, he is still now 75 years old.200 
To begin, the court acknowledged a credibility issue arising out of 
differing Static-99R scores. The court, however, did not proceed to analyze (1) 
how the scores could possibly be different between the evaluators and (2) how 
an evaluator could have a range for a Static-99R score given that the assessment 
is supposed to be based off of concrete and agreed-upon facts. The same issue 
arose with the Static-2002R scoring. Given that these are actuarial instruments, 
each scorer should have identical information and therefore should arrive at the 
same score. Furthermore, because the Static-99R instrument is accompanied 
with a scoring chart, two evaluators should not be able to give a range of risk of 
reoffense scores if one can give a precise numeric value to risk of reoffense. 
Schmidt is one of many cases that expose courts’ apparent acceptance of 
rater discretion when scoring the Static-99R. In United States v. Matherly,201 for 
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instance, the court noted that Dr. Zinik assigned a score of 7 on the Static-99R, 
and that, “[s]imilar to Dr. Zinik, Dr. Cunic gave . . . a score of 7 on the Static-
99R.”202 By including “similar,” the court implied that there is an option, or 
even an expectation, that the scores might not match and that because the scores 
actually did the result is more valid. The court’s default understanding is 
opposite of what it should be: that the Static-99R score should be the same 
across all evaluators and any differences should raise skepticism about the 
instrument’s validity for that individual. 
The Schmidt court importantly recognized that these scores do not equate 
to an individual’s risk of reoffending and engaged in a discussion of relevant 
dynamic factors.203 However, this portion of the opinion exposes some 
misunderstandings about what questions are contained in the Static-99R and 
how that impacts the likelihood of recidivism. Because age is inherently a part 
of the Static-99R scoring—so much so that it can affect an offender’s final score 
by a range of four points—age is already accounted for in the score. To say that 
an evaluator gave more or less weight to age essentially says that they are 
providing an opinion as to the validity of the Static-99R itself. Those factors 
not accounted for in the Static-99R, such as lack of infractions while confined, 
provide new and additional information that a judge should consider to more 
accurately assess the third prong that does not call into question the validity of 
the Static-99R. 
The problems with the Static-99R scoring are not limited to judicial 
interpretations. Evaluators themselves clearly err when administering the 
Static-99R. In an earlier AWA case, one evaluator changed her score via 
testimony after hearing portions of other experts’ testimony.204 She apparently 
determined that the respondent had a “lack of intimate, adult relationships,” 
and consequently added one point to the second item, thereby making her score 
match that of the other evaluators.205 The second item is scored either as a “1” 
or “0” based on whether the offender has “[e]ver lived with a lover for at least 
two years.”206 Using professional judgment to gauge whether an offender has 
well-developed adult relationships is a clinical judgment issue, not a factual 
inquiry. This is the exact type of discretion that the Static-99R was designed to 
avoid, yet the evaluator used such discretion to increase her score of the 
respondent, consequently placing the respondent in a higher risk category than 
the instrument should have. 
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C. Past Criminal History Versus Present Condition 
In determining present dangerousness, courts must balance the weight 
afforded to past acts as compared with present condition. Courts should 
consider a respondent’s present condition in addition to his past criminal 
history. Courts have expressed that past criminal history alone is insufficient to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an individual would have 
serious difficulty refraining from reoffending. Yet, courts are willing to 
acknowledge that past criminal history may have a role in future offending. 
Although some decisions indicate that courts are aware that the Static-99R is 
based on past acts,207 they do not seem to understand the dual weight being 
placed on past criminal history when incorporating the Static-99R into their 
analysis of dangerousness. 
A compelling and logical recidivism argument is that an offender who 
perpetually repeats their crimes has historically demonstrated that they have 
serious difficulty refraining from reoffending, since they have been convicted 
of the crime already and will choose to do it again. Not surprisingly, Dr. Phenix, 
a creator of the Static-99R, has testified that she chooses to focus on pre-
incarceration actions because of her “belief that actions taken while in the 
outside world are more accurate predictors of future behavior upon release.”208 
The First Circuit has recognized that “[a] court could reasonably conclude 
that an individual who has committed multiple offenses but successfully 
completed a rehabilitation program may be less dangerous than someone who 
has committed one offense but exhibits a perpetual desire or propensity to 
commit more offenses.”209 Although this analysis is correct, a court’s hesitance 
to release a sexual offender with a lengthy and disturbing criminal history is 
understandable.210 
AWA hearing opinions—particularly those in which an initial 
commitment is overturned on appeal—emphasize that past acts and criminal 
history are relevant but cannot be the sole basis of determining recidivism.211 
By ignoring past actions in a determination of dangerousness, one overlooks 
important information. Recently, the Fourth Circuit upheld a release order over 
the government’s appeal in part because the district court found that the 
government’s experts “relied too heavily upon historical criminal behavior to 
justify their conclusions that [the respondent] is currently sexually 
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dangerous.”212 The Fourth Circuit supported the district court’s decision not to 
heavily weigh actuarial instruments because they are “based almost entirely on 
historical factors which can never change and do not account for any 
development in . . . mental health.”213 
Yet courts and evaluators alike seem to “double count” these factors. For 
example, one evaluator’s report stated that the offender’s “past history and high 
scores on the Static-99R . . . indicate a very high probability that his past 
patterns of sexually abusing children will continue.”214 Thus, past history 
appears to have been a factor outside the Static-99R; yet the Static-99R, as 
explained in Part II, is comprised entirely of the known past history.215 The 
court then explained that it acknowledged the actuarial instruments but placed 
“greater weight” on “factors outside the actuarial scheme,” including relapse 
(meaning the commission of another sexual crime).216 In doing so, the court 
demonstrated its misunderstanding of what is actually included in the actuarial 
scheme since relapse is incorporated.217 
D. The “Serious Difficulty Refraining” Issue and Static-99R 
Given these problems, both intrinsic to the instrument and the way courts 
use the instrument, courts should critically analyze experts’ opinions, 
particularly those that heavily rely on actuarial instruments like the Static-99R. 
Courts must remember that although “likelihood of reoffense” and “serious 
difficulty refraining” from reoffense can overlap, they are not inherently the 
same inquiry. Therefore, courts should be cautious and ensure their analysis 
matches the statutory language. Courts should recognize that the Static-99R 
provides a background framework to understand statistical risk of reoffense 
while also recognizing that traits unique to the individual that are used to gauge 
whether an individual should be civilly committed are not captured in the 
instrument. 
The intention of the AWA is clear: to civilly commit sexual offenders who, 
because of a mental illness, are likely to reoffend.218 The statutory language does 
not match the intention of the Act. Instead, it requires confinement of those 
who would have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending.219 Courts are in 
the unenviable position of having to toe the line between upholding the 
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intention of the act and adhering to the statutory language. Such a conundrum 
results in opinion passages like the following: 
[E]ven if the court were to fully credit Drs. Ross and Malinek’s estimate 
that respondent’s risk of re-offense is 30% at five years, . . . that still 
leaves a greater than 70% chance respondent will not re-offend. Given 
the evidence of volitional control in this particular case . . . the actuarial 
assessments do not leave the court with a definite and firm conviction 
respondent will commit another contact sex offense if released.220 
Here, the court uses the Static-99R to estimate this respondent’s likelihood 
to reoffend.221 Such an assumption, as discussed earlier, is not supported by the 
literature and is erroneous.222 The court then appropriately acknowledged a 
volitional control consideration which would tend to speak to the “serious 
difficulty from refraining” language in the Act.223 The court ended not with the 
statutory language but with the intention of the Act.224 Although the court used 
some of the correct scientific considerations, the court here appeared to be 
confused about whether to adhere to the intention of the Act or the Act itself, 
ultimately misusing the Static-99R and misapplying the inferences gleaned 
from it.225 
Some opinions have grappled with the issue by simply concluding that, 
because the actuarial instruments “by their own terms” have classified someone 
as high risk for reoffending, the respondent “may be presumed to have the most 
difficulty refraining from sexual reoffending.”226 This conclusory language is 
highly flawed in a scientific application. Simply because someone has conducted 
an act many times in the past does not definitively determine whether or not 
they would have serious difficulty refraining from that activity in the future. When 
considering the liberty interest at stake, since civil commitment is indefinite, it 
is vitally important that courts do not assume scientific truths just because the 
evidence would be easier to understand that way. 
Courts have said that the crux of the difficulty in resolving the third prong 
is that “there is no crystal ball that an examining expert or court might consult 
to predict conclusively whether a past offender will recidivate.”227 Though this 
statement is undoubtedly true, the court’s logic is flawed. The statute requires 
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a finding that an individual would have serious difficulty refraining from 
reoffending, not whether a past offender will or is likely to recidivate. But there 
are many things that an individual may be likely to do at some point in their life 
that he or she would not have serious difficulty refraining from doing. Here is an 
innocuous example: someone with a sweet tooth might be very likely to 
purchase and eat a doughnut later in life. That does not indicate that they would 
have serious difficulty refraining from purchasing and eating a donut if they 
were forbidden from doing so. The issues faced by sexual offenders and those 
with mental illness are much more complex, but the premise that control is not 
synonymous with likelihood spans the analogy. 
Because the AWA is relatively young, the case law surrounding the nuance 
between likelihood and difficulty is limited. State law cases provide an 
important question that federal courts will inevitably grapple with as well. 
Many states have attempted to create a “threshold” risk of recidivism to answer 
the third prong by the relevant evidentiary burden. While some states indicate 
that the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50%,228 others have held the risk 
must be “more likely than not,”229 and others still have simply held that a 
majority likelihood is not necessary.230 In each of these cases the state statute 
specified that the respondent must be likely to reoffend.231 
The early AWA cases likely looked to state cases to attempt to resolve the 
“serious difficulty” inquiry. The Fourth Circuit made clear the relationship of 
likelihood to serious difficulty, finding that the district court erred by insisting 
on “proof of a greater than 50% risk of recidivism,” because it “finds no support 
in the language of the Act.”232 The Fourth Circuit then adopted a portion of a 
Massachusetts opinion, which held that “[r]ecidivism rates are circumstantially 
relevant to the serious difficulty inquiry because offenders who continually 
expose themselves to punishment may be presumed to have the most difficulty 
refraining from sexual reoffending.”233 But the court recognized that “the 
ultimate question called for by the Act concerns the self-control of an individual, not the 
statistical rearrest patterns of a given population.”234 The court invoked the Crane 
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analysis, which emphasized that serious difficulty and recidivism risk will not 
be demonstrable with mathematical precision.235 
The case law is scattered in its treatment of the Static-99R. Some decisions 
place great weight on expert opinion based on the instrument while others seem 
underwhelmed by its incorporation into an expert opinion.236 The prevailing 
definition of “clear and convincing evidence” is that the evidence is of such a 
nature as to produce a firm conviction in the mind of the trier of fact so that 
there is no hesitancy in the perceived truth.237 Given that the Static-99R is 
riddled with more questions than answers, it is difficult to imagine how the 
instrument could be construed to rise to the level of “clear and convincing” 
evidence. 
What is clear in courts’ treatment of the Static-99R, whether the 
instrument is highly regarded or mentioned in passing, is that it is poorly 
understood. This inconsistency in application raises serious concerns about the 
Static-99R and its use in courts. Given the gravity of the liberty interest at 
stake, clarity and consistency are necessary moving forward. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I believe there are many factors that you look at as far as a civil commitment is 
concerned. Certainly you have heard the last two days of a lot of discussion about 
actuarials. One of the things that is really missing is the dynamic factors of how 
that person is now [as compared to his former] acts. Static, meaning it’s all said 
and done and it’s easy to score, . . . but the dynamic factors allow for the growth 
of a person to change or it allows for the person not to change.238 
“Sex offender” is not a mental health diagnosis; instead, sexual offending 
can occur as a result of one too many mental health diagnoses, or of none at 
all.239 The causes of sexual offending are not well understood, and the reason a 
violent rapist offends is likely different than that of a child pornography 
creator.240 Scientific meta-analyses demonstrate that treatment can be effective 
at reducing rates of sexual recidivism.241 Given that the reasons that individuals 
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sexually offend vary widely, an individualized approach is necessary to 
accurately assess an individual’s dangerousness.242 
The Static-99R and other similar static instruments provide necessary 
information to the courts, and this Comment does not argue that they should 
never be used. Rather, this Comment aims to demonstrate their misuse by 
courts and the availability of other information that, when combined with other 
information, paints a more accurate depiction of what “serious difficulty 
refraining from reoffending” means. No scientific literature specifically links 
the Static-99R with difficulty refraining from reoffending. Regarding the 
Static-99R in a vacuum when a statute calls for an assessment of likelihood of 
reoffense is a legitimate use of the instrument—though other factors may still 
be relevant. The language of “likelihood” is simply not what the AWA requires, 
and instead evidence must demonstrate something more than actuarial 
information about how often offenders in a particular group reoffend. 
As the quote above indicates, courts can look at many other factors aside 
from actuarial instruments that either speak to different aspects of the third 
prong or increase the reliability of the data. This section discusses the 
alternatives to relying on actuarial instruments. 
A. Conduct While Confined 
One contested factor critical to understanding if an individual would have 
“serious difficulty refraining” from reoffense is the respondent’s conduct while 
confined. Conduct while confined can speak to volitional control, and although 
it remains uncertain whether a volitional control issue is required as a finding 
in order to civilly commit a respondent, many cases still discuss volitional 
control.243 
Failure to recognize conduct while incarcerated and reliance only on acts 
that occurred prior to conviction can potentially rob an offender of decades of 
personal growth and progress. One recent ruling recognizes this delicate balance 
for an offender who had been in prison for sixteen years and civilly committed 
for an additional ten.244 In a lengthy opinion, the court found that the 
respondent had progressed in treatment and that his behavior had improved 
over the length of his sentence.245 The court further found that, because of the 
respondent’s neurocognitive disorder, he was unable to progress further in 
treatment and that the Static-99R did not apply to him as it might to other 
offenders.246 This nuanced approach recognizes the importance of time and 
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progress while confined, something that is absent particularly from older AWA 
cases. 
Many courts quickly dismiss exemplary conduct while confined under the 
pretext that confinement does not represent reality since there are not 
conventional external stimuli.247 Although earlier AWA cases stated that 
conduct while confined was important, they often failed to include such an 
analysis when the facts may well have been beneficial to the respondent.248 
Newer cases more heavily weigh the fact that “a period of incarceration does 
not freeze the inquiry at the moment an inmate entered prison,” recognizing 
that for lengthy sentences “[m]uch of the expert testimony offered by the 
government would have been identical if this inquiry had been held [at the date 
of incarceration].”249 
Critics argue that confinement does not reflect the outside world, and 
therefore conduct while confined should not be considered in commitment 
hearings.250 While prison provides a controlled environment, certain offenders 
continually get into fights or commit other acts of aggression against fellow 
inmates.251 Given that the entire purpose of the AWA is to civilly commit the 
atypical and exceptionally dangerous offender and that nearly 0.5% of the adult 
male prison population will be a victim of sexual violence,252 it is illogical to 
think that a primary way to identify who would have the most serious difficulty 
refraining from reoffending would exclude conduct while confined. Though not 
identical to the outside world, conduct while confined can be a valuable 
indicator of present dangerousness, especially when considering that a civilly 
committed individual has typically been confined for decades. 
Furthermore, the scientific analyses of this principle do not support the 
proposition.253 Some experts are rightly wary of unstructured clinical opinions, 
viewing them as less accurate than actuarial instruments, and an evaluator 
considering conduct while confined would require clinical opinion.254 However, 
incorporating conduct while confined is a far cry from the poorly predictive, 
unstructured clinical judgments in the early days of civil commitment.255 
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Modern assessments rely on multiple actuarial instruments in addition to 
relevant factors not captured in actuarial instruments.256 Some experts explain 
that certain acts while confined demonstrate an increased propensity to have 
serious difficulty refraining, such as alcohol use while incarcerated.257 
Nonetheless, conduct while confined cannot ethically be used exclusively to 
harm a respondent’s case yet never assist someone in demonstrating that they 
would not have serious difficulty refraining from reoffending. As best stated by 
the Schmidt court, “Time passes. Respondent’s volitional control as it is now is 
the subject of this inquiry, not his posture in 1985. . . . The recent years, in 
which respondent has shown volitional control, even in prison, are evidence in 
his favor.”258 
B. Dynamic Factors and Combining Static and Dynamic Instruments 
Courts’ desire to assign concrete numeric values to dangerousness is 
understandable given how complex the analysis of “serious difficulty refraining” 
from reoffense can be. Indeed, the Static-99R can serve as a good baseline. 
Studies show predictive accuracy increases when the Static-99R is combined 
with other instruments as opposed to a single test.259 For example, the Sexual 
Offender Treatment Intervention and Progress Scale (“SOTIPS”), when 
combined with the Static-99R, increased predictive accuracy up to 0.89, with 
significant prediction of recidivism in all six categories of risk—something the 
Static-99R alone cannot claim.260 Because these dynamic assessments 
incorporate questions that speak to volitional ability, they can speak much more 
clearly to the question the statute asks than the Static-99R alone.261 They cover 
categories such as emotional regulation,262 risk management,263 and 
impulsivity.264 
Furthermore, new research indicates that simply knowing a risk of 
recidivism is not nearly as important as knowing which personality traits highly 
influence that individual’s actions. Researchers recently found that knowing the 
underlying reason for the acts captured in actuarial instruments was more 
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important than just knowing their overall score265: “[K]nowing that an offender 
scored moderately on the Static-99R is not as useful as knowing that this 
offender scored highly on Persistence/Paraphilia and low on General 
Criminality and Youthful Stranger Aggression. For this specific offender, 
treatment providers might de-emphasize anger management treatment 
programs and emphasize self-regulation of paraphilic interests.”266 The most 
useful information comes from “explain[ing] the source of the risk.”267 
Given that civil commitment is intended to provide treatment for mental 
health conditions, the evidence used to determine dangerousness should match 
the criteria that is known to reduce risk.268 Addressing dynamic factors in 
treatment has been scientifically shown to reduce risk of reoffense.269 Critics 
may argue that the science is young on such incorporated lesser-studied factors, 
but recent reports indicate the field of sexual offender recidivism analysis is 
moving towards this hybrid approach.270 Court decisions also mirror this trend, 
acknowledging that individuals may legitimately change over the course of 
lengthy sentences and treatment interventions.271 With the possibility of 
lifelong incarceration on the table, even an incremental improvement in 
predictive validity should be enough to require the use of a more accurate 
methodology to assess an individual’s dangerousness. 
CONCLUSION 
The safety of the public is the utmost priority. Civil commitment through 
the AWA is the mechanism Congress has chosen in order to ensure the public’s 
safety from sexual offenders. Courts have a difficult task to ensure public safety 
while not violating the liberty interests of an offender. As it stands, one of the 
primary pieces of evidence used in civil commitment hearings is the Static-99R, 
which has low predictive accuracy, is commonly misunderstood, and gauges 
only a likelihood of recidivism. To use such an instrument when the Act 
explicitly calls for a determination that an offender would have serious difficulty 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation, combined with the high 
burden of proof, is both unethical and unconstitutional. Viable alternatives exist 
to demonstrate sexual dangerousness, but because the Static-99R has not been 
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convincingly challenged in court, it remains the most prevalent instrument in 
use. By combining dynamic instruments and valuing a sexual offender’s 
progress while confined, courts can both uphold public safety while valuing the 
constitutional liberty interests of respondents who are held past the completion 
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